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Abstract 
We provide a theoretical framework to understand the impacts of consumer reviews and ratings 
on firms’ prices, sales, profits, and consumer surplus.  We show how the economic impacts may 
differ depending on the informativeness of the reviews, the quantifiability of the product attributes, 
and the competitive environment. First, even though a monopolist always benefits from an 
improvement in product rating, a firm in a competitive market can hurt by it. When the low quality 
firm’s product rating improves, its equilibrium profit will decrease if its quality is above a 
threshold, and increase if its quality is below that threshold.  Second, if the high quality firm’s 
product rating improves, both the high quality and the low quality firm will benefit.  Our empirical 
findings based on point-and-shoot digital camera and multivitamin data collected from 
Amazon.com provide strong support for these results. 
Keywords:  Digital word-of-mouth, consumer reviews, e-commerce, online product reviews, 
vertical differentiation, pricing, competitive strategy 
Résumé 
Nous proposons un cadre théorique pour comprendre les impacts des évaluations et des appréciations des 
consommateurs sur les prix pratiqués par les entreprises, leurs ventes, leurs bénéfices et le surplus du 
consommateur. Ces impacts dépendent du caractère informatif des évaluations, de caractère mesurable des attributs 
du produit et de l'environnement concurrentiel. Nos résultats empiriques fondées sur un appareil photo numérique 
automatique et les multiples données recueillies chez Amazon.com viennent soutenir nos principaux résultats. 
摘要 
我们建立了一个理论模型来研究消费者产品评价在其有用性，产品特征可阐述性，和竞争环境不同时如何
对企业价格，销售，利润和消费者剩余产生的不同影响。这个理论模型的主要结果进一步通过我们从
Amazon.com 网站收集的数码相机和多种维生素的数据得到了验证。 
Economics of Information Systems 
2 Twenty Ninth International Conference on Information Systems, Paris 2008  
Introduction 
Compared with offline retail channels, the Internet has limited capabilities in allowing consumers to try out products 
before making purchases.  However, the digital channel offers such advantages as connecting consumers from 
around the world and allowing them to share their product knowledge and usage experiences.  Ever since 
Amazon.com published its first consumer book review in 1995, an estimated 43% of online retailers now offer 
consumer reviews or ratings on their websites (Gogoi, 2007), enabling consumers to inform one another on a variety 
of products from books, CDs, and electronics to apparel and jewelry.  A recent study by eVoc Insights, a consumer 
experience consulting firm, reveals the significant impact of online reviews on consumer behaviors: 47% of 
shoppers read product reviews prior to their online purchases and 63% are more likely to buy from websites with 
online reviews or ratings (Gogoi, 2007).  Online consumer reviews have also penetrated offline channels playing an 
increasingly important role in influencing consumers’ offline purchase decisions of many products such as 
computers, electronics, automobiles, and movies.  It is not surprising that online retailers and industry researchers 
alike have found that consumers trust online reviews more than other marketing communications such as 
newspapers, TV commercials, or promotional emails (Anonymous, 2006; Campanell, 2006).   
Many researchers have studied both the positive and negative effects of traditional word of mouth (e.g., Banerjee, 
1992; Brown and Reingen, 1987; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1995; Katz and Lazarsfeld, 2005; Mahajan, et al., 1984; 
Reingen and Kernan, 1986; Richins, 1983).  Motivated by the popularity of online reviews, academic researchers 
have also examined, both analytically and empirically, the effects of digital word of mouth on firms’ strategies and 
financial performance.  Chen and Xie (2004) consider online consumer reviews as an element of a firm’s overall 
marketing communications mix and show that an online monopolistic seller can benefit or hurt from product 
reviews.  Jiang and Chen (2007) show that with the availability of consumer reviews, both consumer surplus and 
social welfare may be higher in a monopoly than in a competitive market because a monopolist has less incentive 
than competitive vendors to induce (through lowered prices) consumers into buying an unmatched product.  Product 
reviews also influence firms’ optimal advertising and pricing strategies; favorable third party reviews (e.g., from PC 
Magazine, Consumer Report, or CNET.com) may induce asymmetric advertising responses from the vendors 
depending on the market size of the taste-driven consumers and the review penetration rate (Chen and Xie, 2005). 
Given the importance of online reviews, firms may have incentives to strategically manipulate their reviews. 
Dellarocas (2006) shows that competitive firms may be forced to spend resources on manipulating reviews because 
consumer perceptions will otherwise be biased against them.  Mayzlin (2006) finds that a firm with inferior products 
will spend more resources on promotional chat activities than a firm with superior products.   
Empirical evidence shows mixed results on the effects of consumer reviews and ratings. Chevalier and Mayzlin 
(2006) examine online book reviews and find that better reviews lead to higher relative sales. Dellarocas et al. 
(2004) find that online user reviews within the first week of a new movie’s release can be used to provide good 
predictions for the movie’s total revenues.  WOM information actually offers significant explanatory power for both 
aggregate and weekly box office revenues (Liu (2006). Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) examine online book reviews 
and find that better reviews lead to higher sales.  Clemons et al. (2006) use online reviews to assess firms’ 
differentiation strategies in the craft beer industry.  Their research reveals that the variance in the ratings and the 
average of the top positive quartile of ratings are highly correlated with the sales growth, indicating the existence of 
hyper-differentiation and resonance marketing.  However, contradictory empirical results also exist.  For example, 
Duan et al. (2005) find that for movies, user ratings do not have any significant effect on their box office sales 
whereas the number of online postings influences box office sales.  In contrast, Chen et al. (2006) find that for 
books, higher ratings are associated with higher sales and that highly informative reviews (i.e., those with a high 
proportion of helpful votes) strengthen this effect by creating additional sales.  Overall, despite the widely believed 
importance of online reviews and ratings, academic research shows inconclusive results about their exact impact on 
firms’ strategies and resulting performances.  
This paper uses a similar quality differentiation framework as Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) to understand the 
impacts of consumer reviews and ratings on firms’ prices, sales, profits, and consumer surplus.  We illustrate the 
effects of product ratings, and show how such effects may differ depending on the characteristics of both reviews 
and product attributes as well as the competitive environment.  To empirically test some of the key propositions, we 
collected consumer rating, price, and sales rank data on digital cameras and multivitamin sold on Amazon.com 
website.  Results from our empirical analysis provide strong support for the analytical insights.  
We address the following research questions:  (1) Should firms charge higher prices for their highly rated products 
and how do the informativeness of reviews, the quantifiability of the product attributes, and the presence of 
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competition affect their ability to exploit a rating increase? (2) How will firms’ sales volumes and profits change 
when one firm’s product rating changes? (3) How is the consumer surplus affected by product ratings? (4) Can the 
competitive firms be better off when their abilities to change prices (in response to rating changes) are limited?  
This paper contributes to the current literature in several ways. First, it extends Gabszewicz and Thisse’s (1979) 
analysis to understand the impacts of consumer reviews and ratings on firms’ prices, sales, and profits.  It helps us 
understand why different empirical studies may show different results.  Second, our research complements the 
extant theoretical research on online reviews and ratings. Our research focuses on the reviews and ratings of 
products rather than those of vendors (e.g., Brown and Morgan, 2006; Livingston, 2005; Pavlou and Dimoka, 2006). 
We examine a vertically differentiated market rather than a horizontally differentiated market as considered by other 
researchers such as Chen and Xie (2004) and Jiang and Chen (2007). In addition, these researchers assume that 
consumers are uncertain about whether a product matches their preferences.  Third, unlike much of the analytical 
literature (such as Chen and Xie, 2004), this paper models the effects of both reviews and ratings. To the best of our 
knowledge, this paper is the first in the extant literature to analytically examine how the impact of product ratings is 
affected by product characteristics in addition to the informativeness of reviews and the presence of competitors.  
Lastly, we empirically examine the analytical insights using consumer rating and price data on digital cameras and 
multivitamins sold on Amazon.com website.  
Our model builds upon the primitive that product reviews and ratings affect the perceived quality of a product.  We 
decompose the perceived product quality into two parts arising from two types of product attributes—search versus 
experience/credence. The quality of the search attributes is easily communicated through product specifications and 
is perfectly known by consumers, whereas the quality of the experience/credence attributes is imperfectly known 
and is influenced by reviews and ratings. We find that when its product rating increases, a monopolistic firm will 
take advantage of the resulting increase in the perceived product quality by raising the price of its product and 
enjoying higher profits.  Moreover, the firm will increase its price more if the reviews are more informative or if the 
product has a high proportion of experience/credence attributes.  A higher product rating will never decrease a 
monopolist’s optimal sales volume.   
In the competitive market, we examine two firms with quality differentiated products and find that an improvement 
in product ratings does not necessarily lead to increases in price, sales, or profits. Interestingly, we find that an 
increase in the product rating of the high-quality firm will lead to higher prices, lower sales, and higher profits for 
both firms. Intuitively, the low quality firm benefits from its competitor’s increased rating because the increased 
rating of the high quality firm effectively makes it more differentiated from its competitor and hence price 
competition becomes less intense. In contrast, an increase in the low-quality firm’s rating reduces the difference 
between the perceived qualities of the two firms’ products and hence leads to more intensified competition, which 
leads to a price cut by the high quality firm and which definitely reduces the high quality firm’s equilibrium profit. 
However, the low quality firm’s optimal pricing strategy in response to the increase in its product rating depends on 
how differentiated the products are. For the low quality firm, an increase in its product rating has two opposing 
effects. On the one hand, the improvement in its rating increases the perceived quality of its product leading to 
higher willingness-to-pay by consumers. On the other hand, its product now becomes less differentiated in the 
perceived quality space from its competitor’s product, and price competition between the firms may hence be more 
intense. We find that there exists a threshold of the low quality firm’s perceived quality below which the low quality 
firm’s best strategy in response to an increase in its rating is to increase its price yielding higher equilibrium profits.  
If the low quality firm’s perceived quality is above this threshold, however, it will have to reduce its price because 
of the anticipated price cut by its competitor, and ultimately, the improvement in its product rating actually reduces 
its profits. We also find that though the consumer surplus always becomes larger when the low quality firm’s rating 
increases, an increase in the high quality firm’s rating may reduce the consumer surplus because the effect of 
lowered price competition may dominate the effect of consumers’ increased product valuation.  
The rest of our paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we present our model and discuss the model 
assumptions.  We analyze the impact of consumer product reviews and ratings in the analysis section. We provide 
the analysis for a monopoly setting followed by that for a duopoly market.  We then present the empirical evidence 
for the testing of our major propositions. Last, we conclude our paper and discuss possible future research.  
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Model 
We assume that products are vertically differentiated (i.e., quality differentiated) rather than horizontally 
differentiated as in Chen and Xie (2005) or Jiang and Chen (2007). That is, all consumers rank product qualities the 
same way. Our vertical differentiation model is similar to the ones used by many other researchers (e.g., Gabszewicz 
and Thisse 1979; Moorthy 1988; Mussa and Rosen 1978; Shaked and Sutton 1982) with the exception that the 
quality levels in our model are formed from consumers’ perceptions based on product characteristics and are 
affected by consumer reviews and rating.1 The net consumer utility function is given by ,),,(),( PvrQPvu −⋅= λη  
where P is the price of the product, v represents the type of the consumer and ),,( ληrQ  is a function of three 
parameters—the average rating (r) of the product, the informativeness (η) of the reviews, and the quantifiability (λ) 
of the product attributes. We assume that consumers are uniformly distributed in the type space; without loss of 
generality, we normalize the distribution to unity, i.e., ].1,0[uniform~v   The product rating, denoted by r, is the 
average product rating from all reviews; the informativeness (η) of the reviews represents how informative or useful 
the reviews are.  Researchers (Nelson 1970 and 1974; Darby and Karni 1973) are the first to classify goods and 
services into search, experience, and credence categories based on how readily consumers can determine the 
qualities of such goods and services. In this paper, we use a continuous parameter—quantifiability (λ)—to represent 
how quantifiable  the product attributes are, and we operationalize λ to be the proportion of relevant product 
attributes that are search attributes (and hence easily communicated through product specifications).  Note that 
),,( ληrQ  represents the perceived product quality. In the real world, a true and objective quality level, even if it 
exists, is unlikely to be perfectly perceived ex ante by all consumers.  Our model provides an alternative way to 
consider quality. Instead of assuming a perfectly observed, objective quality level, we assume that consumers form 
some perception about product quality from product information including reviews and ratings.  We make no 
explicit assumptions about to what value the perceived quality level converges.  Researchers who believe the 
existence of a true, objective quality level may consider our perceived quality to eventually converge to that true 
quality level as consumers receive “perfect information” (product specifications, reviews and ratings, etc.).  
Practitioners may not be interested in whether a “true” quality level exists or what it is; they are most interested in 
consumers’ perceived quality level and how to influence that level, because, after all, consumers make purchase 
decisions based on the product quality they perceive. Our model addresses practitioners’ needs by explicitly 
considering three concrete parameters that influence perceived quality and by examining their impact on firms’ 
sales, prices, and profits.  
We decompose the perceived quality into two parts—one from the product’s search attributes and one from its 
experience/credence attributes: ),()1(),,( ηλλλη rfrQ −+= .  Consumers perfectly observe the search attributes 
based on product specifications, and infer the quality of the experience/credence attributes from consumer reviews 
and ratings.  In assuming this functional form, we have normalized the average quality contribution from the search 
attributes to unity and thus, ),( ηrf , the quality contribution from the experience/credence attributes, is relative to 
that of the search attributes. We have also implicitly assumed that consumers have perfect knowledge about the 
search attributes even without review or rating information; this is very reasonable assumption because such 
attributes are usually clearly stated in the product specifications. Examples of search attributes are the number of 
pixels, the optimal zoom, and the LCD screen size of a digital camera, or the binding and the number of pages of a 
book.  Examples of the experience/credence features are the image quality and ease of use of a digital camera or the 
writing quality of a book.  Different products may differ in their quantifiability.  For example, books contain mainly 
experience/credence attributes, blank CD-Rs or CD-RWs mainly search attributes, while digital cameras are 
somewhere in between.  In essence, we have constructed a normalized, one-dimensional, perceived quality measure 
from the two types of relevant product attributes. 
                                                          
1
 Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) consider consumers with different income levels to study quality differentiation in a duopoly. 
We consider consumers to have a single willingness-to-pay parameter, and explicitly model the different components of quality.  
Though our model framework and assumptions are different, our results do show some of the same intuitions of Gabszewicz and 
Thisse mathematically expressed in different forms.   
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We make two assumptions on ),( ηrf , i.e., on how ratings and reviews affect consumers’ willingness to pay 
(WTP). First, 0),( >ηrf r ; that is, ceteris paribus, consumers’  WTP for a product increases as its rating increases.2 
This is a reasonable assumption. A high product rating can be considered as a form of positive advertising; 
advertising, as assumed by many researchers (e.g., Adams and Yellen, 1977), raises consumers’ reservation prices 
(i.e., WTP) for the product. Second, 0),( >ηη rf r ; this implies that the positive effect of ratings on consumers’ 
WTP is stronger if the reviews are more informative. That is, other things being equal, consumers should be more 
willing to pay for a high-rating product if they find its reviews to be informative or trustworthy than otherwise.  To 
empirically validate our assumptions, we conducted a pilot study on 28 undergraduate students, asking them about 
their WTPs on digital cameras with different consumer ratings and informativeness of reviews.  Results strongly 
support both of our assumptions.  Note that we take reviews and ratings as exogenous in the sense that the micro 
dynamics of how reviews and ratings evolve is not modeled in this paper. That is, in our game, firms and consumers 
take reviews and ratings as given. 
Analysis: Monopoly market 
We first consider a single-product monopoly. We assume that the fixed cost of production is sunk. Let c denote the 
marginal cost of the product. A consumer of type v will buy the product if and only if .0),( ≥Pvu  Consumers have a 
utility of zero if they do not purchase the product. Each consumer buys at most one unit of the product. As discussed 
earlier, the perceived quality is given by ),()1(),,( ηλλλη rfrQ −+= , where ),1,0(∈λ  0),( >ηrf r  and 
0),( >ηη rf r . The number of consumers who will purchase the product at price P is given by ),,(1)( ληrQ
PPq −= .  
The firm’s profit is 





−−=−=Π ),,(1)()()( ληrQ
P
cPqcPP . The maximum profit is achieved at  
2
),,(* ληrQcP += , which results in a sales volume (i.e., the total quantity of the product sold) of 
),,(2
),,(*
λη
λη
rQ
crQq −=  and a profit of ),,(2
),,(*
λη
λη
rQ
crQ −
=Π .   
Proposition 1:   In a monopoly, a higher product rating leads to a higher optimal price and a higher profit. A 
higher product rating does not affect the optimal sales volume of information goods (for which c=0), while it 
increases the sales volume for non-information goods.3 
Proposition 2:   
(a) The product rating’s effect on the firm’s optimal price is larger if its reviews are more informative; that is, 
0
*2
>
∂∂
∂
r
P
η
;     
(b) The product rating’s effect on the firm’s optimal price is larger if the product has a smaller quantifiability 
factor; that is, 0
*2
<
∂∂
∂
r
P
λ
.     
Effectively, when a monopolist’s product rating increases, the firm can increase its price and make higher profits 
because the improved rating increases the perceived quality of the product and thereby consumers’ WTP.  How 
much the firm’s price will increase in response to a rating improvement depends on how informative the reviews are 
and on the product’s quantifiability factor. The more informative are the reviews and the lower the product’s 
                                                          
2
 In this paper, unless otherwise noted, a function with a letter subscript represents the partial derivative of the 
function taken with respect to that variable, e.g., 
r
ff r ∂
∂
≡  and 
r
ff r ∂∂
∂
≡
ηη
2
. 
3
 All proofs in this paper are provided in the Appendix. 
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quantifiability factor, the higher the firm’s ability to exploit its product rating increase by charging a higher price. 
We next study a competitive market to analyze how one firm’s rating changes will affect its own sales, prices, and 
profits as well as those of its competitor. 
Analysis: Duopoly market 
We now consider two firms each of which offers one product to compete in a vertically differentiated market.  Their 
products have different perceived quality levels (e.g., due to differences in reviews, ratings, or some product 
attributes). A consumer of type v derives a utility of iiiiiii PvrQPvu −⋅= ),,(),( λη  from product i (of firm i), where 
iP , ,ir  ,iη  and iλ  are product i's price, rating, review informativeness, and quantifiability, respectively. The 
perceived qualities of the two products are given by ),()1(),,( 11111111 ηλλλη rfrQ −+=  and 
),()1(),,( 22222222 ηλλλη rgrQ −+= , respectively, where f and g satisfy the regularity assumptions: 
,0),( >ηrf r 0),( >ηη rf r , ,0),( >ηrg r  and 0),( >ηη rg r . Without loss of generality, we assume that product 1 
has a higher perceived quality, i.e., ).,,(),,( 22221111 ληλη rQrQ >  Consumers derives zero utility if they do not 
purchase any product. Each consumer buys at most one product. A consumer of type v will buy product i if and only 
if 0),( ≥ii Pvu  and ),(),( jjii PvuPvu >  for .ij ≠ 4  These two conditions are commonly known as the individual 
rationality and incentive compatibility constraint, respectively. Firms’ sales volumes are functions of their prices and 
the perceived qualities: ),;,( 2121 QQPPqi . 5   Firms’ profit functions are thus given by 
),,;,()( 2121 QQPPqcP iiii ⋅−=Π  where ic  denotes the marginal cost of firm i’s product.  Firms maximize their 
profits by strategically (non-cooperatively) setting the prices of their products based on their perceived qualities. For 
ease of exposition, we assume that both products have zero marginal cost. It is straightforward to extend our analysis 
to non-zero marginal costs though the calculus becomes cumbersome; results from such an extension are 
qualitatively the same as long as the marginal costs are small compared with consumers’ maximum WTP. 
The equilibrium prices, sales volumes and profits are given by Lemma 1.  Propositions 3 and 4 summarize how the 
equilibrium will change when one firm’s product rating changes incrementally.6 
Lemma 1: At equilibrium, firms’ prices are 
21
121*
1 4
)(2
QQ
QQQ
P
−
⋅−
=  and ;
4
)(
21
221*
2 QQ
QQQ
P
−
⋅−
=  their sales volumes 
are 
21
1*
1 4
2
QQ
Q
q
−
=  and ,
4 21
1*
2 QQ
Q
q
−
=  yielding profits of 2
21
2
121*
1 )4(
)(4
QQ
QQQ
−
⋅−
=Π  and ,
)4(
)(
2
21
2121*
2 QQ
QQQQ
−
⋅−
=Π  
respectively. 
Proposition 3:  Effect of an incremental change in the high-quality product’s rating 
If the high-quality firm’s product rating improves (deteriorates),  
(1) both firms’ equilibrium prices will increase (decrease); 
(2) both firms’ equilibrium sales volumes will decrease (increase); 
(3) both firms’ equilibrium profits will increase(decrease).  
 
Proposition 4:  Effect of an incremental change in the low-quality product’s rating 
If the low-quality firm’s product rating improves (deteriorates),  
                                                          
4
 Without loss of generality, we assume that if consumers are indifferent between products, they will pick one with higher 
perceived quality. 
5
 To avoid notational clustering, we will not explicitly write out the arguments of functions Qi from now on. 
6
 We assume that the change in product ratings does not completely switch the relative quality perception of the products.  For 
example, after an increase in the low-quality product’s rating, consumers will perceive the low quality product to have a higher 
quality than before, but its perceived quality is still assumed to be lower than that of the high-quality product.  
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(1) its equilibrium price increases(decreases) if its perceived quality is relatively low (i.e., 12 )324( QQ −< ) 
and decreases (increases) otherwise; its competitor’s price will always decrease (increase); 
(2)  the equilibrium sales volumes of both firms will increase (decrease);  
(3) its equilibrium profits will increase (decrease) if its perceived quality is relatively low (i.e.,
7
4 1
2
QQ < ) and 
decrease (increase) if 
7
4 1
2
QQ >  whereas its competitor’s profit will always decrease (increase). 
Propositions 3 and 4 show what will happen if one firm’s product rating changes. We highlight two interesting and 
surprising results. First, if the firm with the higher perceived quality (i.e., firm 1) improves its product rating, both 
firms will benefit.  If firm 1 keeps its price constant after an increase in its product rating, firm 2’s optimal response 
will be to lower its own price to prevent some of its customers from switching to firm 1’s product. Such anticipated 
price cut by firm 2 makes it suboptimal for firm 1 to keep its price fixed; in other words, stealing its competitor’s 
customers is not firm1’s best strategy. Firm 1’s optimal strategy is to increase its price, which leads to slightly lower 
unit sales but a higher profit because of the increased profit margin. How large a price increase is optimal depends 
on the perceived qualities of the products as well as the size of the rating change.  In response to firm 1’s price 
increase, firm 2 has some incentive to slightly increase its own price.  It is somewhat counter intuitive that a low-
quality firm would prefer an increase rather than a decrease in its competitor’s product rating. Essentially, an 
increase in the high-quality firm’s rating helps alleviate the pressure of price competition because it leads to further 
separation between the perceived qualities of the firms’ products.  
Second, an improvement in the low-quality product’s rating can either benefit or hurt its firm’s own profitability. It 
is counter intuitive that a firm may actually be hurt by an increase in its product rating. Proposition 1 shows that in a 
monopoly setting, an increased product rating improves the firm’s profit. In the competitive setting, however, the 
low-quality firm faces two effects from its rating’s improvement. On the one hand, its improved rating means that 
consumers are more willing to pay for its product; this can potentially allow the firm to increase its price. On the 
other hand, its product is now closer, in the perceived quality space, to its competitor’s product; the reduced product 
differentiation increases the pressure for the firms to compete on price. Which of these two effects dominates 
depends on the relative quality difference.  If the low quality is low enough (i.e.,
7
4 1
2
QQ < ), the positive effect on 
consumers’ WTP plays a dominant role and the low quality firm’s profit will increase as a result of the improvement 
in its product rating.  If 
7
4 1
2
QQ > , however, the lower quality firm will suffer from an increase in its product 
rating; that is, intensified competition reduces both firms’ equilibrium profits even though their sales volumes both 
increase at equilibrium. In addition, though the high quality firm will always lower its price in response to an 
improvement in the low quality firm’s rating, the low quality firm’s optimal pricing strategy depends on the relative 
quality levels. If 12 )324( QQ −< , the low quality firm will increase its price after its product rating improves; 
otherwise, its optimal price will be lower than before because of competitive responses.7  
Proposition 5 shows how changes in product ratings affect the consumer surplus. We find that consumers always 
benefit from a rating improvement of the low quality product because of increased valuation of the product and 
intensified price competition between firms.  However, when the high quality product’s rating improves, consumers 
may be worse off because the effect of reduced price competition can dominate the effect of increased product 
valuation especially when the perceived product qualities are close. 
Proposition 5:  Effect of an incremental change in the product rating on consumer surplus 
As the high-quality firm’s product rating improves (deteriorates), consumer surplus becomes larger (smaller) if 
5
4 1
2
QQ <  and smaller (larger) if .
5
4 1
2
QQ >  In contrast, as the low quality product’s rating improves 
(deteriorates), consumer surplus always becomes larger (smaller). 
                                                          
7
 The underlying intuitions expressed in Proposition 3 and 4 are first discussed in Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) albeit in a 
context unrelated to product reviews and rating. 
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Empirical Evidence 
To empirically validate some of our propositions, we collected product, consumer rating, price, and sales rank data 
for point-and-shoot digital cameras and multivitamins from Amazon.com in March and April 2007 using an 
automated data collection agent designed by following Allen et al.’s (2006) recommendations.  We selected these 
two product categories to represent products with different quantifiability factors.  Digital cameras have not only 
product features such as resolution in mega pixels and optical zoom that can be specified but also product features 
such as image quality, color saturation, and ease of use that cannot be easily specified. On the other hand, 
multivitamins have mainly quantifiable product features as their ingredients are clearly marked on the labels. 
Because Amazon.com not only sells its own products but also allows third-party sellers to sell their products on its 
website, our data were pricing and sales data from multiple sellers.  We summarize the sample descriptive statistics 
in Table 1.  The sales ranks of digital cameras and multivitamins were those in the camera and photo and the health 
and personal care categories, respectively.  
Table 1.  Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Point-and-shoot digital cameras (N1=355) 
Mega Pixels 5.49 1.71 1.00 10.10 
Optical Zoom 3.11 1.84 1 12 
Average Star Rating 3.80 0.91 1 5 
Price 234.85 141.06 22.95 899.80 
Sales Rank 3118 4032 1 24473 
Multivitamins (N2=139) 
Average Star Rating 4.28 1.15 1 5 
Price 20.49 11.13 5.35 65.59 
Sales Rank 69972 79074 851 331294 
 
To determine whether a product is of high or low quality, we first divided each sample into subgroups of similar 
qualities based on their search attributes.  For example, we divided digital cameras into 33 subgroups, each group 
with similar resolution in mega pixels and optical zoom.  For multivitamins, we divided the data into 13 subgroups 
based on the market segmentation (adults, men, women, vegetarians, senior, children, etc.), whether the product is 
chewable or not, and some additional ingredients such as irons and whole food.  Within each subgroup, we 
examined how the average consumer rating of a product, as well as the average consumer ratings of products with 
the opposite quality, affects the price and sales of the product. We identified a product as a high quality one if its 
average consumer rating was higher than the sample average. The sample average consumer rating was 3.80 for 
digital cameras and 4.28 for multivitamins.  As a result, digital cameras with average consumer ratings of 4 stars or 
higher were high quality products, while multivitamins with average consumer ratings of 4.5 stars or higher were 
high quality ones.  
Because corporate profit data are unavailable, we examine how ratings affect prices and sales.  Prior research has 
found a close relationship between the sales rank and sales quantity of a product (Brynjolfsson, et al., 2003; 
Chevalier and Goolsbee, 2003), and sales ranks have been used as a proxy for the sales volume (Chen, et al., 2006; 
Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006).  So in our research, we use –ln(Sales Rank) as a proxy for the sales of a product.  
Econometric models and results for digital cameras 
We first discuss our econometric models and empirical results for point-and-shoot digital cameras.  We use the 
following econometric models: 
ln(Pricei)=α + β1Ratingi + β2Ratingi·Qualityi + β3OppositeQualityRatingi  
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              + β4OppositeQualityRatingi·Qualityi + β5MPi + β6OpticalZoomi + β7ln(DaysAvailablei)  
              + β8AmazonasSelleri, (1) 
and 
-ln(Sales Ranki)=α′ + β1′ Ratingi + β2′ Ratingi·Qualityi + β3′ OppositeQualityRatingi  
              + β4′ OppositeQualityRatingi·Qualityi + β5′ MPi + β6′ OpticalZoomi  
              + β7′ ln(DaysAvailable i) + β8′ AmazonasSelleri + β9′ InStocki + β10′ Promotionsi, (2) 
where Ratingi is the average consumer star rating for Product i; Qualityi is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if 
Product i is of high quality, and 0 otherwise; OppositeQualityRatingi is the average rating of all products of the 
opposite quality in the same subgroup; MPi is the maximum image resolution in mega pixels; OpticalZoomi is the 
optical zoom of the camera; ln(DaysAvailable
 i) is the natural logarithm of the number of days for which the product 
had been available on Amazon.com, since digital cameras generally exhibit a declining price trend over time; 
AmazonasSelleri is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if Amazon.com is the featured seller, and 0 otherwise.  When 
predicting the sales rank, we also added two more variables indicating whether a product was in stock and whether 
there were any promotions for the item since during our sample period, Amazon.com offered free memory cards, 
photo printers, and picture prints for selected cameras.  The key variables that allow us to test our propositions are 
Ratingi, Ratingi·Qualityi, OppositeQualityRatingi, and OppositeQualityRatingi·Qualityi. We add image resolution 
and optical zoom into our model to capture the impacts of these two main characteristics of digital cameras on prices 
and sales. Since the price of a model tends to decline after its release, we also add ln(DaysAvailable
 i) to capture this 
effect. Finally, because Amazon.com also allows third-party sellers, we add a dummy variable AmazonasSelleri to 
reflect the impacts of Amazon.com being the seller on the prices and sales. 
We summarize the empirical results for digital cameras in Table 2.  Overall, our models had a good fit with the data, 
as indicated by the R-squares. Many of our control variables are significant and most signs are in the expected 
directions.  One exception is ln(DaysAvailable), whose impact on ln(Price) is positive.  This suggests that products 
that were available on Amazon.com longer were sold at higher prices—contradictory to the declining price trend 
that we usually observe for digital cameras.  A close examination of our data revealed that many sellers were still 
selling older models at high prices, even though prices for digital cameras were declining as the technology became 
mature and newer models were available at lower prices.  
Table 2.  Empirical Results for Digital Cameras 
 ln(Price) -ln(Sales Rank) 
 Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev. 
Intercept 3.493 0.543*** -10.778 1.865*** 
Rating (β1, β1′) 0.101 0.054* 0.765 0.172*** 
Rating·Quality (β2, β2′) 0.075 0.101 -0.847 0.325** 
OppositeQualityRating (β3, β3′) 0.005 0.118 -0.278 0.377 
OppositeQualityRating·Quality (β4, β4′) -0.032 0.100 0.851 0.327*** 
MP (β5, β5′) 0.111 0.017*** 0.239 0.056*** 
OpticalZoom (β6, β6′) 0.074 0.017*** 0.037 0.054 
ln(DaysAvailable) (β7, β7′) 0.078 0.030*** -0.163 0.096* 
AmazonasSeller (β8, β8′) -0.236 0.060*** 0.329 0.263 
InStock (β9′) — — 2.016 0.553*** 
Promotions (β10′) — — 1.124 0.344*** 
N 355 355 
R-Square 0.36 0.34 
Notes: ***, p<.01; **, p<.05, *, p<.10. 
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We next report the testing of our propositions.  To facilitate comparisons, we summarize the signs of the expected 
effects in Table 3 and report our observed effects in Table 4. We calculated the significance of the sums of the 
coefficients based on their variances and the covariances.  Our empirical results show that the signs of the effects of 
rating changes are all in the expected directions.  Propositions 3(1), 4(1), and 4(2) are supported or partially 
supported.   We use “partially supported” when only part of a proposition was supported by our data. For example,  
β
 3+ β4  was not significant as predicted by Proposition 4(1) but β1=.101 was significant as predicted by the same 
proposition, so we say that Proposition was partially supported. The non-supported propositions are all due to 
insignificant results. 
Table 3.  Expected Signs of the Effects of Rating Changes Based on Our Propositions 
 When High Quality Product(s)’s 
Rating Increase(s) 
When Low Quality Product(s)’s 
Rating Increase(s) 
Change in high quality 
product’s price  
P3(1):  + P4(1): - 
Change in high quality 
product’s sales 
P3(2):  - P4(2): + 
Change in low quality 
product’s price  
P3(1):  + P4(1): +/- 
Change in low quality 
product’s sales 
P3(2):  - P4(2): + 
 
Table 4.  Proposition Testing Results for Digital Cameras 
 When High Quality Product(s)’s 
Rating Increase(s) 
When Low Quality Product(s)’s 
Rating Increase(s) 
Change in high quality 
product’s price  
β1+ β2=.101+.075=.176** 
(P3(1) partially supported) 
β
 3+ β4=.005+(-.032)=-.027ns  
Change in high quality 
product’s sales 
β1′+ β2′=.765+(-.847)= -.082ns  β3′+β4′=-.278+.851= .573*  
(P4(2) supported) 
Change in low quality 
product’s price  
β3=.005ns β1=.101*  
(P4(1) partially supported) 
Change in low quality 
product’s sales 
β3′= -.278ns β1′=.765***  
(P4(2) supported) 
Note: ns: not significant at the .10 level. 
 
Econometric models and results for multivitamins 
We next discuss our econometric models and empirical results for multivitamins.  We use the following econometric 
models: 
ln(Pricei)=α + β1Ratingi + β2Ratingi·Qualityi + β3OppositeQualityRatingi  
               + β4OppositeQualityRatingi·Qualityi + β5Servingsi + β6AmazonasSelleri, (3) 
and 
-ln(Sales Ranki)=α′ + β1′ Ratingi + β2′ Ratingi·Qualityi + β3′ OppositeQualityRatingi  
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              + β4′ OppositeQualityRatingi·Qualityi + β5′ Servingsi + β6′ AmazonasSelleri  
              + β7′ InStocki + β8′ Promotionsi. (4) 
The definitions of the variables are similar to those in Models (1) and (2).  One new variable, Servingsi, measures 
the number of daily servings that a multivitamin product contains.  As the number of severing increase, we expect 
the price of a product to increase. 
We summarize the empirical results for multivitamins in Table 5.  Overall, our models have a good fit with the data, 
as indicated by the R-squares. Most of our control variables are significant and their coefficient estimates have the 
expected signs.  One interesting observation is that, compared with other sellers, Amazon.com had lower prices for 
digital cameras, but higher prices for multivitamins.  This suggests that Amazon.com adopts different pricing 
strategies in these two markets.  
Table 5.  Empirical Results for Multivitamins 
 ln(Price) -ln(Sales Rank) 
 Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev. 
Intercept -0.380 1.180 -5.417 3.562 
Rating (β1, β1′) 0.070 0.059 0.398 0.182** 
Rating·Quality (β2, β2′) 0.560 0.259** -1.807 0.770** 
OppositeQualityRating (β3, β3′) 0.563 0.245** -1.648 0.726** 
OppositeQualityRating·Quality (β4, β4′) -0.529 0.265** 1.767 0.783** 
Servings (β5, β5′) 0.001 0.0005*** 0.003 0.002** 
AmazonasSeller (β6, β6′) 0.064 0.094 1.458 0.310*** 
InStock (β7, β7′) — — 1.009 0.470** 
Promotions (β8, β8′) — — 0.174 0.268 
N 139 134 
R-Square 0.17 0.36 
 
Table 6 reports the proposition testing results. Our results show that six out of eight parts of the propositions are 
supported. The non-significant results are Propositions 4(1) and 4(2) related to the impacts of a rating increase of the 
low quality product on the price and sales of the high quality products. In particular, the sign of β
 3′+ β4′ is in the 
expected direction but the result is insignificant; the sign of β
 3+ β4 is insignificant and is not in the expected 
direction.  That is, we don’t find that an increase in the low quality product’s rating will prompt the competitor to 
lower the price of the high quality product. One possible reason may be that, due to the quality perception gap in our 
samples, sellers of the high quality products might not perceive the low quality product as a big threat, reducing their 
incentive to lower their prices. Another plausible reason may be that sellers of the high quality multivitamins want to 
avoid triggering intense price competition and hence refrain from cutting prices in response to the increase in the 
competitor’s product rating. 
Table 6.  Proposition Testing Results for Multivitamins 
 When High Quality Product(s)’s 
Rating Increase(s) 
When Low Quality Product(s)’s 
Rating Increase(s) 
Change in high quality 
product’s price  
β1+ β2= .070+.560=.630** 
(P3(1) supported) 
β
 3+ β4=.563+(-.529)=0.034ns 
Change in high quality 
product’s sales 
β1′+ β2′=.398+(-1.807)=-1.409* 
(P3(2) supported) 
β
 3′+ β4′=-1.648+1.767= .119ns  
Change in low quality 
product’s price  
β3=.563** 
(P3(1) supported) 
β1=.070ns  
(P4(1) partially supported) 
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Change in low quality 
product’s sales 
β3′= -1.648**  
(P3(2) supported) 
β1′=.398*** 
(P4(2) partially supported) 
 
There are also differences between the results for our two samples. Proposition 3(1) was only partially supported by 
the digital camera sample but was supported by the multivitamin sample. Proposition 3(2) was only supported by the 
multivitamin sample.  In general, multivitamin’s prices and sales were more sensitive to an increase in the high 
quality product’s consumer rating.  One possible explanation might be that the digital camera market was more 
competitive and consumers were more price sensitive. Hence, when the high quality product’s rating increased, the 
seller was reluctant to increase its price as that would have lead to decreased sales.  This also diminished the lower 
quality product seller’s incentive to increase its own price.  
Overall, our empirical evidence provides strong support for our key propositions.  The signs of all but one effect 
were in the expected directions, validating our analytical model. However, we note that we did not include 
manufacturer of the digital camera or multivitamin in our empirical models. Even though the manufacturer captures 
brand specific effects, it is highly correlated with the perceived quality (consumer rating) in both samples as 
manufacturer can capture non-quantifiable quality. For example, manufacturer itself explained 52% and 62% of the 
variations in consumer rating for digital cameras and multivitamins, respectively. Hence, including the manufacturer 
in our models would introduce multicollinearity problems and prevent us from isolating the impact of enhanced 
quality from the impact of the manufacturer. However, we did run the models by adding manufacturer. The results 
remained roughly the same except for β
 3′+ β4′ of the digital camera sample, which became insignificant. 
Conclusions and Future Research 
In this study, we develop an analytical model to examine how consumer product ratings and reviews affect prices, 
sales, profits, and consumer surplus in monopoly and duopoly markets with heterogeneous consumers. Using the 
consumer rating, price, and sales rank data collected from Amazon.com for point-and-shoot digital cameras and 
multivitamins, we provide empirical validation of our results. Our research contributes to the marketing literature in 
several ways.  First, our research points out conditions under which consumer rating improvements may either 
benefit or hurt firms’ sales and profits, thus allowing us to better understand the contradictory findings in the extant 
empirical research literature regarding the impacts of consumer ratings on sales. Second, to the best of our 
knowledge, this paper is the first to analytically model consumer reviews and ratings in a vertically rather than 
horizontally differentiated market with heterogeneous consumers and competition.  Third, we take into consideration 
not only the consumer ratings and the informativeness of the reviews but also product quantifiability in examining 
the economic impacts of consumer ratings and reviews. 
Our research results offer the following managerial insights on firm strategies.  First, if a firm has monopoly power 
in a market, it should always take advantage of consumers’ higher WTPs due to higher consumer ratings and more 
informative reviews by raising its price to enjoy higher profits. As an alternative to corporate marketing 
communications, consumer ratings and reviews allow consumers to inform each other on the experience/credence 
attributes (i.e., the difficult to communicate/specify product features).  Combined with product specifications on the 
search attributes, consumers can better infer the overall product qualities.  
Second, in a vertically differentiated market, a firm’s optimal strategic response to consumer rating improvements 
should depend on its relative product quality.  When the firm’s product quality is relatively high, an improvement in 
its product rating will result in further separation between the perceived qualities of its product and those of its 
competitors’.  This is equivalent to a more vertically differentiated market and will thus ease the competitive 
pressure.  As a result, all firms in the market can strategically increase their prices and enjoy higher profits, even 
though their sales volumes decline.  In contrast, when the firm’s product is of a relatively low quality, an increase in 
its product rating will reduce the distance between the perceived qualities of its product and those of its 
competitors’, resulting in intensified competition.  Depending on the ratio of the firm’s product quality to that of the 
high quality competitor, the firm’s optimal response to its rating’s improvement may be either to increase or to 
decrease its prices, and it will generate either higher or lower profits. The seller of the high quality product is always 
hurt by the rating improvement of its low quality competitor and is forced to reduce its prices making lower profits 
even though it may sell more units.  In addition, our analysis shows that although consumers will always benefit 
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from a rating improvement of the low quality product, they may either benefit or be hurt if the high quality product’s 
rating improves.  
Third, we find that although the flexibility in adjusting prices may lead to higher profitability for both firms when 
consumer ratings improve for the high quality products, such flexibility will lead to the prisoner’s dilemma under 
other situations and result in a price war with decreased profits for both firms.   
Our study has limitations.  In our model, consumer reviews and ratings are exogenous in that firms do not 
strategically influence or manipulate their reviews and ratings even though they will respond to rating changes. We 
have assumed that consumers do not make multiple purchases. Future research may relax these assumptions and 
examine the dynamic effects of reviews and ratings.  We have not modeled how firms can strategically change either 
components of the perceived quality, perhaps through investment in advertising or product development. Our on-
going research seeks to expand the current framework to study firms’ strategic investment decisions in addition to 
the strategic pricing decisions. One may also study a more general setting with both horizontal and vertical product 
differentiation.  In addition, we were unable to test Proposition 4(3) due to unavailable profit data on specific 
products. Future research can examine this issue when such data become available from online sellers such as 
Amazon.com.  Finally, we tested our propositions using data from only two product categories collected at one point 
in time.  Future research can use panel data to examine if our propositions hold true for other products over an 
extended period of time.  
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Proof of Lemma 1: 
Consumer purchasing decisions observe the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. That is, a 
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Solving these conditions simultaneously, we obtain the equilibrium prices (noting that the second order conditions 
for profit maximization clear hold). 
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Proposition 3 follows immediately from the interpretations of these results.   □ 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
Similar to the proof of Proposition 3, this proof requires computing the comparative statics with respect to the 
product rating 2r . 
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Proposition 4 follows immediately from the interpretations of these results.      □ 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
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Proposition 5 follows from the interpretations of these comparative statics.      □  
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